Why Alternative Parties Must Get
Range
Voting, or DIE
Plurality voting leads to a two-party system. So does IRV. Range voting is far
superior to either; it allows voters to rationally consider more than two choices.
|
Harsh Reality
It's quite a surreal and hostile world we minor parties live in. Confronted with
the latest missteps by our elected officials, we shake our fists in the air,
engage in passionate discourse to find solutions, and ultimately send our best
and brightest into the political cauldron. But the result is that, when our
candidates affect elections at all, it is almost invariably to harm the
mainstream candidate most similar to ours. It seems we are gluttons for
punishment, much like the 97,488 Floridians who voted for Nader in 2000, only to
help secure the victory for Bush.
I recently read an article by a nationally syndicated columnist, in which he
suggested that Libertarians (and ostensibly Greens et al.) close up shop as a
political party altogether, and focus their efforts to form an interest group
like the National Rifle Association or the League of Women Voters. In his words
they are currently little more than a "high-school-level debating club". While
his remarks drew the ire of Libertarians far and wide, any among us with an ear
for reality knows he has a point. America's minor parties can talk all day about
their great ideas, but our number one
priority is to find a way to win a significant number of contentious
elections. If we can't do that, then this columnist's point sticks. Hence the
question: how do we break out of two-party duopoly? We must find an
innovative way to do that, because nothing
we've tried so far has worked.
We Need a Better Voting Method
"Insanity" is doing the same thing over and
over again and expecting different results. – Albert Einstein
The Status Quo
If you were trying to design the worst way to vote, you might:
-
Force voters to say the least possible amount – name just one candidate, and
say nothing about how much they like or dislike any of the others.
-
Make it reward voters for not voting for whom they really
want.
-
Make it operate, over time, in such a way as to diminish your number of
choices to the minimum possible number – only 2 (or 1).
-
And for the coup de grâce, make there be an easy way to invalidate ballots
("over-voting") – just to make life easy for fraudsters.
But wait, that's our voting system now! There are a lot of voting methods, and
Plurality Voting (aka "first
past the post") is one of the worst imaginable – not just for minor parties,
but for everyone. It can do astoundingly stupid things, such as this:
|
#voters
|
their vote
|
|
28
|
A>B>C>D
|
|
25
|
B>C>D>A
|
|
24
|
C>D>B>A
|
|
23
|
D>C>B>A
|
Here, A would lose to any opponent in a
head-to-head election by a huge 72-to-28 margin, far larger than the hugest
"landslide" in US presidential election history. But thanks to the incredibly
poor Plurality Voting system, A is
elected with 28% of the vote. Two of the results of this behavior are stifling
two-party domination, and low voter satisfaction with the results.
The Perfect Foil
There are those who believe that hope lies in a system called
Instant
Runoff Voting. But IRV has been used for the better part of a century
in countries such as
Australia,
Ireland,
Malta, and
Fiji, and has produced
two-party domination, just like the US has experienced with Plurality Voting.
Australianpolitics.com
even says IRV "promotes a two-party system to the detriment of minor parties and
independents." Ironically, that duopoly has been broken in at least
21 of the 27 countries that use traditional
runoff elections. These have subtly – but evidently importantly –
different
political dynamics than instant runoff
elections. But
(suicidally?!)
throngs of minor party and independent voters have worked to replace the runoff
system with IRV in places like Oakland, CA, presumably because they did not
understand that.
Myths
and misinformation have unfortunately been perpetuated by the popular press and
(worse) by IRV-advocacy organizations such as the Center for Voting and
Democracy. Two of the top myths are that IRV
"eliminates
spoilers" and that it only elects
"majority
winners".
Many IRV enthusiasts, such as
Richard
Anderson-Connolly, dismiss such problems and refuse to back superior
voting methods, citing the apparent
"momentum"
of IRV. First of all, the momentum claim is
false. Most US citizens don't even know
what IRV is. Not a single US state has adopted it. Approximately
two
dozen U.S. cities (the largest being New York City, in 1936) have
implemented it, only to have almost entirely reverted to Plurality. In 2006,
four US municipalities approved IRV in ballot initiatives, so IRV adherents,
unaware of IRV's history, have gotten the impression that IRV is some kind of
new and great idea, that will also save minor parties from the certain doom
that has been the fate of every minor
party in America's history. Well, no. IRV in America is like an airplane
prototype that keeps coming back down shortly after liftoff. And again, if we
look at countries where it actually has
taken off, it has produced two-party duopoly.
Yet some IRV enthusiasts, fully aware of this
fact, still cling to IRV, in the desperate hope that if it could
somehow eventually take root, it might
one day allow us to transition to a proportional representation system called
Single Transferable Vote (which would
provide a small number of seats for minor parties). The idea of proportional
representation is that multi-winner bodies, such as legislatures or city
councils, should approximate the diversity of the electorate they represent;
so if 10% of the voters are with Party-X, Congress should be about 10%
Party-X, or at least significantly more than 0%. IRV is just STV applied to a
single-winner election, like mayor, governor, or president; so the transition
seems feasible. But America's history
shows that IRV has indefinitely stalled, and there's no reason to believe that
the duopolistic forces of our mainstream political parties would ever work to
overcome enormous legal hurdles in order to implement a system like STV, that
would only weaken their power. And even if they did, their biggest roadblock
would be the
Supreme
Court. Finally, STV isn't even a particularly good method for proportional
representation. So let any delusions about IRV die. It is, as Devin Ray
Freeman has said, a
"bullet
in the foot" for minor parties. The same is true of other methods, such as
Condorcet,
Borda,
and possibly even Approval Voting.
The Real Deal
The solution to this predicament is a system called Range Voting, advocated by
the Center
for Range Voting, an electoral reform advocacy group founded in 2005 by
Princeton math Ph.D. Warren D. Smith and engineer Jan Kok. With this method,
voters simply score every candidate on scale of, say 0-10 or 00-99. The winner
is the candidate with the highest average. This system is so simple that many
cannot help but feel skeptical that it could work for large-scale political
elections. Won't it produce mediocre, greatest-common-denominator candidates?
Won't it be especially susceptible to strategic voting, in which voters belie
their sincere preferences in order to get a better result for themselves?
Won't it be too complicated?
To answer these kinds of questions objectively, Dr. Smith turned to both
mathematical and real world experiments. In 2000 he wrote an open source
computer program designed to calculate the utility efficiency (resulting voter
satisfaction) of numerous voting systems. Hundreds of millions of simulated
elections were performed, using 720 different combinations of five basic
parameter ("knob") settings. For instance, electorates ranged from 100% honest
to 100% strategic, and from 100% informed to 100% ignorant. Here are the results
from two of those 720 combinations, averaged over millions of simulated
elections, expressed as
voter
satisfaction ratios:
|
Utility measurements: Group A: 5
candidates, 20 voters, random utilities; Each entry averages the results
from 4,000,000 simulated elections. Group B: 5 candidates, 50 voters,
utilities based on 2 issues, each entry averages the results from
2,222,222 simulated elections.
|
|
Voting system
|
VSR A
|
VSR B
|
|
Magically elect optimum winner
|
100.00%
|
100.00%
|
|
Range (honest voters)
|
96.71%
|
94.66%
|
|
Borda (honest voters)
|
91.31%
|
89.97%
|
|
Approval (honest voters)
|
86.30%
|
83.53%
|
|
Condorcet-LR (honest voters)
|
85.19%
|
85.43%
|
|
Range & Approval (strategic exaggerating voters)
|
78.99%
|
77.01%
|
|
IRV (honest voters)
|
78.49%
|
76.32%
|
|
Plurality (honest voters)
|
67.63%
|
62.29%
|
|
Borda (strategic exaggerating voters)
|
53.26%
|
51.78%
|
|
Condorcet-LR (strategic exaggerating voters)
|
42.56%
|
41.31%
|
|
IRV (strategic exaggerating voters)
|
39.07%
|
39.21%
|
|
Plurality (strategic voters)
|
39.07%
|
39.21%
|
|
Elect random winner
|
0.00%
|
0.00%
|
|
|
From
http://RangeVoting.org/vsr.html
|
As we can see, Range Voting dominates the other methods,
especially when voters are strategic.
So we can sell Range Voting to
everyone, not just minor parties.
Democrats and Republicans will derive
hugely greater average satisfaction
with Range Voting. And with Range Voting, spoilers are truly
eliminated, not just decreased as with
IRV. By entering an election, a minor party candidate either wins, or doesn't
change the outcome. He never helps the opposing candidate win. This is good
for both major and minor parties.
Most importantly for us, Range Voting experimentally produces substantially
better results for minor parties. This is largely attributed to what has been
called the
"nursery
effect", but regardless of why it happens, it is an empirical fact that it
does. Consider the results of a pseudo-random poll of 122 US voters, conducted
simultaneously with the 2004 US presidential elections. Real election results
are in the middle, with experimental Range Voting averages on the right:
|
Candidate
|
Plur
|
RV (0-99)
|
|
Bush(Rep)
|
50.7
|
40
|
|
Kerry(Dem)
|
48.3
|
55
|
|
Nader
|
0.38
|
25
|
|
Badnarik
|
0.32
|
9
|
|
Cobb
|
0.10
|
5
|
|
Peroutka
|
0.12
|
6
|
|
Calero
|
0.003
|
4
|
An online Range Voting
poll for the 2008 US presidential election, with over 1,500 participants as
of January 13, 2007, had Libertarian Michael Badnarik beating several major
party politicians: John Kerry, Dennis Kucinich, Joe Biden, Mark Warner,
Condoleeza Rice, Bill Richardson, Nancy Pelosi, Mitt Romney, Evan Bayh, Tom
Vilsack, Newt Gingrich, Tom Tancredo, Harry Reid, Chuck Hagel, Mike Huckabee,
George W. Bush, Michael Bloomberg, George Allen, Sam Brownback, and Bill Frist –
and this in spite of the fact that the poll
is topped by liberals Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, Al Gore, and John Edwards.
Greens also beat several major party candidates. By performing that well in a
real election, a minor party candidate could get significant publicity, and be
taken seriously by the press, and by voters. People would stop thinking of
alternative parties as a waste of time, and start paying more attention to their
message. With any luck, they might actually start to
win elections! At that point they could
work to enact the proportional representation version of Range Voting, called
Reweighted
Range Voting. Not only is it an easy transition from Range Voting,
automatically defaulting to standard Range Voting when used for single-winner
elections, but it is superior to STV in virtually every way.
Despite all this evidence, there are still some I've encountered who remain
unconvinced. They feel that we've got to work to get fairer funding and
participation in debates, and that if we keep up the good fight, eventually
we'll make some headway, even with Plurality Voting. But as the entire history
of democracy in our world vividly attests, the only factor that has ever
correlated with a healthy multi-party system in single-winner elections, is
having the right kind of voting method.
A Historical Perspective
History shows that US minor parties all seem to reach their all-time peak within
about 1-16 years of founding, then diminish. Once they've fallen to about 5% of
what they were at their peak, they die. Their founders perhaps suffer from the
delusion that their idea, that new socio-politico-economo-religious-ecological
idea that is special to their party, is so wonderful or different that, maybe,
just this once, that party will be able to overcome
Duverger's law
and win, or at least grow into a viable party.
And so, they foolishly choose once again to concentrate on their wonderful idea
and to ignore (or nearly so) the idea of improving the voting system. They don't
understand that it just doesn't matter what their idea is. No matter what it is,
if one of the major parties gives some slight lip service to that idea, say
equivalent to just 2% of what the minor party wants, then even Plurality Voters
who like that minor party best, are fully strategically justified
mathematically/statistically in voting major-party, and in fact do so – in
around a 10:1 ratio. Nothing can overcome that ratio. And then Duverger's law
wins and they die like usual. Here are the stats.

Libertarian Party
|
year
|
canddt
|
vote/total-votes
|
=%
|
|
1972
|
J.Hospers
|
3,674 / 77,744,027
|
0.005
|
|
1976
|
R.MacBride
|
172,553 / 81,531,584
|
0.212
|
|
1980
|
E.Clark
|
921,128 / 86,509,678
|
1.065
|
|
1984
|
D.Bergland
|
228,111 / 92,653,233
|
0.246
|
|
1988
|
R.E.Paul
|
431,750 / 91,594,686
|
0.471
|
|
1992
|
A.V.Marrou
|
290,087 / 104,423,923
|
0.278
|
|
1996
|
H.Browne
|
485,000 / 96,275,401
|
0.504
|
|
2000
|
Browne
|
386,000 / 105,417,258
|
0.366
|
|
2004
|
M.Badnarik
|
397,265 / 122,293,332
|
0.325
|
|
2008
|
?
|
|
|
The Libertarians still seem alive and kicking, but judging from history,
presumably also are on a downward trajectory, and even at their peak in 1980
never came close to four of the parties in the graph above. Today's minor
parties are dwarfs even compared to the minor parties of the 1900s. Can
Libertarians afford to sit around twiddling their thumbs, focusing on things
other than trying to change the voting system? Probably not. Add many more
years to this Libertarian trajectory and extrapolate for yourself. If the
Libertarians drown, it will be because they waited too long to make voting
reform their top priority.
Green Party
|
year
|
canddt
|
vote/total-votes
|
=%
|
|
1996
|
R.Nader
|
685,297 / 96,275,401
|
0.71
|
|
2000
|
Nader
|
2,883,105 / 105,417,258
|
2.74
|
|
2004
|
D.Cobb
|
119,859 / 122,293,332
|
0.10
|
In 2004, when the Greens (judging by their election result) appeared about to
die, Cobb and Badnarik both noted in their debates that they advocated IRV.
Badnarik and his Libertarian 2004 running mate Campagna now both have endorsed
Range Voting.
Conclusion
Throughout US history, alternative parties have inevitably died within a
relatively short time frame, with 100% consistency. At the most, they have
simply stopped running candidates, and evolved into political interest groups.
History tells us that if we do not do something revolutionary, we are destined
to meet the same fate. So take all of those those high-minded ideals you've got,
and set them aside for a moment. Your single most urgent task is to pull out all
the stops, and pool your resources together with those of other voting reform
advocates, in order to get Range Voting. And I mean
today. Join the
Center
for Range Voting. Participate in their
online
discussion group. Donate money
or time.
Endorse
them. Help improve their
web site. And
most importantly, spread the word! Tell
friends, elected representatives, and members of your political party to support
Range Voting. It's
life
or death!
11 Comments
Printer Friendly Version
Top of Page
|
|